Professor Judson is a noted scholar of the Habsburg Empire whose works are often cited by fellow historians. He has now produced a new history of the empire, which covers the period from Maria Theresa till the end of World War I. I wish I could say that I had learned a lot of new things from it but, alas, his book turns out to be an idiosyncratic, discursive, extended essay that examines social and economic as well as constitutional matters in a very patchy kind of way to the almost total exclusion of foreign policy, military history, and even major political developments. As a result it is not only Hamlet without the Prince but without Gertrude, Ophelia, Polonius, Rosencrantz and Guildenstern. Sometimes events occur without explanation (World War I, for example) while others are totally omitted (Metternich's supposed plans for the federalization of the empire or Taaffe's Iron Ring to give only two examples, both of which actually relate to Judson's favourite theme of the management of nationalism within the Empire). Again, some themes -Austro-Slavism in 1848 for example -are mentioned but are never heard of again.
If Judson's book is a rather empty one it is none the less highly pretentious, since he claims to speak on behalf of a generation of scholars whose work on Central Europe is so brilliant that it constitutes a beacon of enlightenment to other scholars of modern Europe whose achievements no longer measure up. Distilling that work, Judson seems to believe that he has discovered a whole new way of looking at nationalism in Central Europe, although the intellectual gold he thinks he has found turns out to be more like brass. Nationalism, he claims, was "event-driven" and "situational," rather than static. But so was socialism, conservatism, liberalism, communism and fascism. All politics are event-driven and situational, although this does not seem to have dawned on him. Politics are never static, never operate at a constant pace and are certainly not always at fever pitch. Events are unpredictable and may lead to crises after which more normal levels of political activity and argument resume. Political parties everywhere and at all times are subject to highs and lows in levels of support. So why does he think he has discovered something new in the history of the Habsburg Monarchy? Historians have for a long time discussed the growth of nationalism there from intellectual beginnings to mass movements. Here for example is A.J.P. Taylor in a famous review article which frankly tells us more about the Habsburgs in half a dozen pages than does Judson's whole book:
The first age of national awakening is strictly academic. It is led by university professors and is concerned with such things as the study of medieval manuscripts, the evolution of a national language from a peasant dialect, and the rewriting of history on national lines. The second stage comes when the pupils of the professors get out into the world. Then it is a question of the language used first in secondary, finally in elementary schools; the battle is fought over popular newspapers, not over learned works of research. Finally, the elementary school-teachers themselves have pupils: men of some education, who remain peasants or factory workers.
We have arrived at mass-nationalism . . .
[Yet] There can never be a time at which, say, the equation 'German equals German nationalist' is true. 1
Taylor added:
Only when nationalism becomes a mass movement do the mass movements become important. On the other hand at this very time they begin to lose their non-national character. In the last decade of the Habsburg monarchy both international socialism and international clericalism were beginning to disintegrate under the impact of nationalism: and the process was carried further in the inter-war years. 2 Judson covers this ground but fails to see the whole picture; he talks a lot about schools but writes that the transition from ideological to cultural nationalism "seems to have occurred with breathtaking speed" from the 1880s without explaining why (299). As for the fact that the Social Democrats split into separate Czech and German parties, Judson simply notes that this happened in 1911. He is more interested to stress that they were "a mass party in favour of a democratic vision of empire." (373). The other theme emphasized by Judson is that for the whole period the peoples of the Monarchy were loyal citizens thanks to the benefits bestowed on them by a progressive imperial bureaucracy. Thus his favourite characters are Maria Theresa, Joseph II, and Alexander von Bach, the instigators of reform in the empire, although he is at pains later to count every local school or swimming pool built in the Monarchy as a sign of imperial benevolence. The real secret behind the endurance of empire, in his view, was the solid work of the bureaucrats in building roads, railways, schools, museums, parks, opera houses, and swimming pools, or at least 3 For this unpopularity and the quotation see, Gerhard Ammerer, "The Austro-Turkish War (1788-91) and public opinion in Vienna," in Subversion providing funds for them. There was no real opposition from nationalists and when there was, it was not fundamental but merely event-driven and situational. Thus the Badeni crisis of 1897, which caused Germans to riot throughout Austria and Bohemia, riots which brought about the retraction of government ordinances making Czech equal to German in the internal administration of Bohemia and caused the resignation of the prime minister, is explained away as an example of popular mobilization, which integrated more people into the political process and eventually opened Franz Joseph's mind to compromises and electoral reform (314-5). Since public opinion gradually cooled down once the crisis was over, Judson sees it simply as "a classic example of event-driven or situational nationalism" (315-6). We shall return to this crisis later. Judson is not exactly generous with evidence to prove that the people were positively enthusiastic concerning bureaucratic reforms. He clearly thinks that they should have been but that is another matter. He concedes that Hungary and the Austrian Netherlands (modern Belgium) revolted against Joseph II. But he stresses that the peasants were grateful for the agrarian reforms that Joseph and his mother, Maria Theresa, instigated. And indeed they were. Yet Joseph died as much disliked among the population of Austria as elsewhere due to the taxes he imposed to pay for his unpopular war against Turkey in 1788. There were riots at the gates of the imperial palace, the Austrian commander could not show his face in the city and prayers were offered for a Turkish victory. Police reports filed in 1788-89 were unanimous regarding the unpopularity of both the war and the emperor. The war, it seems, cost Joseph not merely his physical health but the last remnants of his popularity as well. Little wonder he banned a handbill entitled A Few Words Concerning the Current War, which described the imminent bankruptcy of Austria: "In the aftermath of squandering the treasures of the Church, they (the bureaucrats) now clutch greedily at the property of their subjects, in order to make the entire country a doss house for beggars." 3 But then Judson ignores foreign policy and its effects on domestic affairs entirely.
Judson, nonetheless insists that the empire was always popular and that the educated classes in particular believed in it and its ability to improve the welfare of its peoples. Any evidence to the contrary is omitted and some of the evidence provided is weak. The celebrations held all over the empire when peace arrived in 1814, he claims represented "unified feelings of loyalty to the Austrian state and to its dynasty" (100). Perhaps, but they probably just represented feelings of relief that the war had ended. Certainly the Austrian army that returned after defeating Napoleon saw no signs of patriotism. Radetzky and others complained that the populace were enthusiastic about Blücher of Prussia and Alexander I of Russia but had little enthusiasm for the Austrian army, whose heroism was discounted. 4 After 1815 there is little sign of the Austrian patriotism that Judson believes the Josephenist reforms inspired. True, he downplays the advances of the Metternich period but there is reason to believe that by 1848, genuine Austrian patriotism among the educated classes may have been scarce. The noted pamphleteer and editor, Franz Schuselka, for example, wrote several pamphlets on the theme that "if Austria ceases to be German, she ceases altogether to be Austrian." 5 He favoured a united Germany not a united Austria. He was supported by perhaps the most famous Austrian political critic of the 1840s, Baron Viktor von Andrian-Warburg, author of the influential two-volume work Austria and Its Future, who wrote that Austria was a purely imaginative name, which signifies no self-contained people, no country, no nation, a conventional usage for a complex of sharply distinct nationalities. There are Italians, Germans, Slavs, Hungarians, who together constitute the Austrian Empire but there is no Austria, no Austrian, no Austrian nationality, nor has there ever been any save for a strip of land around Vienna. 6
If he was right, then Judson is wrong. The views of Schuselka and Andrian-Warburg raise the further point, which Judson ignores, whether the Germans and Hungarians were privileged nationalities in Austria-Hungary. This has been a common viewpoint among historians. After all Andrássy, the Hungarian leader is supposed to have told an Austrian colleague after 1867 that the true meaning of the Compromise of that year was "you look after your Slavs and we'll look after ours." Judson, however, seems to imply that the imperial authorities saw all nationalities as equals in the way once described by the Archduke Albrecht: "In a polyglot empire inhabited by many races and peoples the dynasty must not allow itself to be assigned exclusively to one of these. Just as a good mother, it must show equal love for all its children and remain foreign to none. In this lies the justification for its existence." 7 Judson might not quote this rather saccharine formulation but he does quote the American historian István Deák: "There were no dominant nationalities in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy" (13). I can only assume from the text of his book that he endorses this view. Yet he acknowledges that the voting systems for most of the time did indeed benefit the Germans and Magyars. Indeed even the pre-war Compromises he discusses did so. The truth was that while the Magyars were obviously a privileged nation in Hungary, in Cisleithania the Germans were also one. The Archduke John, for example, had to take foreign minister Stadion aside in 1808 and tell him that the Emperor Francis thought of himself as German as he himself did. John indeed became a notorious German nationalist and was chosen in 1848 to be Reichsverweser or head of the new supposedly uniting German state at Frankfurt. Franz Joseph is even said to have referred to him as Onkel Reichsvermoderer (Uncle Reich murderer -referring to the Austrian Empire) on this account. 8 Metternich, meanwhile, after the Galician massacres of 1846, had written that what was now needed there was the promotion of the German element to civilize the province through the use of German in schools, greater use of the language generally and the sale of feudal estates to Germans. 9 The civilizing mission, which Judson describes at work in Bosnia-Herzegovina after 1878, did not emerge out of nowhere. And it was not just a civilizing one but a Germanizing one.
The extent of German dominance within the Empire can be judged from the following figures: In 1914 in the central ministries of Cisleithania, seventy-six percent of civil servants were German, and in the joint ministries that linked the eastern and western parts of the Dual Monarchy, the corresponding figure was still as high as fifty-six percent. (Germans formed only twenty-four percent of the population of the Monarchy as a whole and only thirty-six percent of that of Cisleithania.) They were over-represented in the top posts to an even higher degree. In 1910, for example, German Austrians filled eighty-one percent of the top six grades of the Finance Ministry, which was widely thought to be well disposed to the claims of candidates of other ethnic groups. In the Foreign Ministry, the figure was only sixty-five percent, but that was still more than twice the proportion of German-Austrians in the total population. As in the civil service, so, too, in the army. In 1910 roughly two-thirds of the officer corps were German Austrians, the figure being eighty-five percent in the western part of the Empire. As far as Parliament was concerned, sixty-six percent of the Reichstag members were German-Austrians in 1873, fifty-two percent in 1885 and even after the introduction of universal suffrage in 1907, the proportion was forty-four percent. Since civil servants tended to dominate the cabinet in Cisleithania, there, too, the German-Austrians predominated. In 1900, the Koerber cabinet was almost exclusively filled with them. Industry and finance, finally, was also dominated by Austrian-Germans. In terms of industrial production, the Alpine provinces and the Sudetenland predominated, while Vienna, the financial hub of the Empire, controlled eighty percent of share capital in 1900 and sixty-seven percent in 1914. 10 Thus the historian Peter J. Katzenstein has concluded:
Until 1918 Empire-wide institutions like the bureaucracy and army continued to offer the German-Austrians opportunities for upward social mobility (especially at the centre of the empire) which they could hardly expect to find in Germany. Furthermore, the German character of those institutions provided symbolic and actual reassurance, and strengthened the sentimental commitments of the German-Austrians to the Empire. From both an instrumental and a sentimental perspective, in the eyes of German-Austrians, the Empire continued as a going concern; and when it finally collapsed under the cumulative impact of internal and external strains and stresses, the German-Austrians were the last ethnic group to abandon it. 11
Their loyalty, in short, was always conditional. Before 1789, they, like other Germans, had felt a resurgent loyalty to the Holy Roman Empire. In 1848 they had sent deputies to the Frankfurt Parliament and had played a distinguished role there. But they knew they were more advantaged under the Habsburgs, who awarded them a privileged position inside their empire. Karl to negotiate a separate peace with the British, French, and Italians. Indeed, they would almost certainly have supported the German invasion of the Empire that would have inevitably followed. In any case, Karl never offered a separate peace. (Judson is wrong in suggesting he did, p. 420.) This brings us to the subject of foreign policy, one which Judson refuses to cover in his book and one which forces us to consider the historiography of the decline and fall of the Habsburg Empire. Basically there have been two schools here. The first, best represented in the work of A.J.P. Taylor, sees the Monarchy as a machine for the conduct of foreign policy. 12 Essentially it was the power-base, which the Habsburgs used in pursuit of their foreign-policy aims. Their interest in the peoples of the Monarchy was simply a proprietorial one and meant that there could be no democratic constitutional reforms since these would have deprived the dynasty of its power. Only reforms which left the Habsburgs in control -mainly those concerning local or regional government -could be accepted. This was why the dynasty was so fond of finding its doom in a "Piedmont." A Piedmont or a Serbia challenged the very basis of Habsburg power. As rival states they simply had no plans to preserve the Habsburg dynasty. Ironically, the nationalities inside the Empire were willing to tolerate this situation to be protected by Habsburg power. In Taylor's words: "in the last resort, the Habsburg Monarchy was not a device for enabling a number of nationalities to live together. It was an attempt to find a 'third way' in Central Europe, which should be neither German nor Russian." 13 The nationalities knew that the alternative to Habsburg rule was not independence but to be ruled by Germany or Russia. Taylor adds: "once the Habsburgs became Germany's satellites in war, they had failed in their mission. Their doom was of their own making." 14 Historians of this school believe that foreign policy considerations -particularly the need to maintain honour and prestige -led the Habsburgs -quite deliberately -to launch a war against Serbia in 1914 which became World War I (as they knew it would), a war which indeed brought about their doom.
The other school of historiography, mainly associated with American rather than British historians, saw the paradigm of Habsburg historical problems in Oszkár Jászi's famous work, The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy, 15 which concluded that the Monarchy fell because it never instituted a well-balanced federalism to solve the nationality problem. 16 London and New York: Longman, 1989 Longman, , second edition, 2001 Steven Beller, The Habsburg Monarchy, 1815 -1918 , (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018 . 18
The remark may be apocryphal.
As a result, historians of this school have always seen the demise of the Habsburgs resulting from their failure to reform the Monarchy in such a way that would have satisfied the basically dissident nationalities. Indeed, the general view arose that it was essentially the hostility of the nationalities (especially the South Slavs) that caused World War I. From this perspective, the Empire was a victim, as much as Franz Ferdinand and his wife, of dissident nationalists.
In my own book of 1989, The Decline and Fall of the Habsburg Empire, 16 I suggested that there was nothing inevitable about the fall of the Empire, that the nationality problem was hardly fatal and that the population despite great hardship had stuck with the Habsburgs until almost the very end of World War I. Steven Beller in the introduction to his recent history of the Monarchy from 1815 to 1918 has called my book the start of revisionism in English. 17 Since then a whole host of books have suggested that the nationalities inside the Monarchy were able to tolerate it, whether as a result of multilingualism, pragmatism, or simple resignation. Now Judson has entered the fray arguing that nationalism was merely situational and event-driven and that the imperial bureaucracy was much more constructive on behalf of the nationalities than previously supposed, implying that they were much more grateful. As to how foreign policy shaped their fate -as it did quite regularly -he does not say. Nor does he have anything much to say about the men who dictated policy, the Habsburg emperors themselves. For my own part, I strongly believe the latter simply took all the nationalities for granted, assumed their support in times of peace, and saw them basically as a means of providing cannon fodder and taxes. To be sure, modern times, revolution in 1848 and, later on, the need for healthy recruits and wealthier taxpayers, may have encouraged welfare reforms. And no doubt a certain imperial paternalism was involved. Yet Franz Joseph was not a man of sentiment. He really did not believe that the empire could be run constitutionally and he found it difficult to communicate with anyone, including his own family. Hence he clung as far as he could to the forms and ceremonials of absolutism, retaining a veto over all legislation and making foreign and defence policy his own. He clearly took his peoples for granted. His hero was his grandfather Francis I, who had supposedly demanded of an "Austrian" patriot, "But is he a patriot for me?" 18 The nationalities for their part, given the failure of the 1848 revolutions (which brought the Monarchy very close to collapse, although Judson
